

~~SECRET~~

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST POSITION ON SOVIET SATELLITE RELATIONS

1. A New York Times dispatch from Warsaw reporting a split between Russia and China on Russia's European satellite policy has aroused speculation as to whether such a disagreement exists and to what extent. This is an attempt to document the Chinese position.

Chou Said to Have Encouraged Ochab

2. Under the headline "Red China Supports Poles Against Moscow Dictation", the New York Times on 16 October 1956 carried a story by Sydney Gruson claiming that Mao Tse-tung told Party First Secretary Ochab in Peking in September that the Poles should go ahead in efforts to obtain internal independence and develop their own social system as the Yugoslavs have done. Gruson told Warsaw American Embassy officials on 18 October that his sources were two members of the Communist Central Committee in Warsaw. He said he has subsequently learned that the Chinese spokesman was Chou En-lai, and not Mao, and that the context of the statement was a conversation on the Poznan riots. Gruson said he was told that Chou agreed with the Polish interpretation that the cause of the riots was failure to meet the just demands of the workers, and disagreed with the Russian stand that the riots were incited by "counterrevolutionaries". According to what the Poles told Gruson, Chou added "Poland should not be dictated to by the Kremlin". (Warsaw Embassy telegram 462)

Polish Intelligentsia Exploits New "Liberal" Chinese Policy Toward Intellectuals.

3. Edmund Osmanczyk, a Polish journalist covering the United States elections, was reported by an informant, who has furnished reliable information in the past, to have said that the Polish "revolt" could not have taken place without certain moral encouragement and support furnished to Poland by the Chinese Communist Party. Osmanczyk said that before he came to the United States (August 7, 1956), he was aware that the Polish "revolt" would take place, but did not know when. About six months ago a Chinese leader, whom Osmanczyk identified as the number-three man in the Chinese Communist Party, wrote an article criticizing the one-sidedness of the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

development of Communist doctrine. He stated that China was admired twenty-five hundred years ago for its leadership and development; this was because there was a wise dynasty in control in China which encouraged discussion of idealistic and materialistic approaches. According to Osmanczyk, the Chinese leader said that only a discussion of these two approaches would lead to a new synthesis which in turn would lead to the full development of China. He said the Chinese criticized the Stalin doctrine of one approach and stated dissenters should not be destroyed. Osmanczyk stated the pronouncement on the part of the Chinese established precedent for dissent. The statement by the Chinese Communist was fully translated in the Polish press and widely circulated in Poland.

The "progressives" of Poland adopted this idea from China. About six months ago clubs of young "intelligentsia" were organized in Poland. These were not strictly Communist Party clubs; however, the Communist Party of Poland took the lead in the formation of these clubs, according to Osmanczyk. There was free discussion on the Chinese article at these clubs. Moscow papers slightly criticized the formation of these clubs and the discussion of the Chinese article, Osmanczyk said. Polish authorities justified these meetings and discussions on the ground that they were merely discussions of the Chinese theory. These discussions led to a sharp division between the Stalinists and the "progressives" in Poland, according to Osmanczyk.

The speech referred to by Osmanczyk appears to be "Let Flowers of Many Kinds Blossom, Diverse Schools of Thought Contend!", delivered by Lu Ting-yi on 26 May 1956. Lu is not number-three man in the party, but he is Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, and in this instance was speaking on a policy specifically stated to have originated with Mao Tse-tung. The policy is a recognition that China needs top production from its intellectuals and technicians if its twelve-year goals are to be met. In order to stimulate this production the effect of past thought-control campaigns and drives against counterrevolutionaries must be mitigated. The new policy purports to grant freedom to Chinese intellectuals to advance non-Marxist, but not anti-Marxist, positions in their writings. The policy is not nearly as liberal in its application in China as the Poles seem to have interpreted it. In Lu's speech he specifically condemns the ideas of Hu Feng for being counterrevolutionary and unacceptable

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

even under the new policy; yet Hu Feng is presently in jail for recommending that the CCP ease its control of the fine arts. The Chinese intellectuals went through a period of critical examination during the campaign against Hu Feng in 1955. They seem unlikely to test the limits of the new "liberal"-sounding policy while the ideas of Hu Feng are still considered counterrevolutionary. The Polish intellectuals, according to Osmanczyk, apparently have taken the Chinese policy at its face value and have used it to justify their criticism of the regime.

In Supporting 30 October USSR Statement on Relations with Satellites,
Chinese Emphasize Mutual Equality, Call Certain Polish and Hungarian
Popular Demands "Proper" and Deplore "Bourgeois Chauvinism"

4. On 30 October, after Gomulka had become Party First Secretary in Poland and the Hungarian revolt had begun, Radio Moscow broadcast the official Russian position on relations with the satellites. The principles of peaceful coexistence, friendship, equality of states, and cooperation were reaffirmed, but the Warsaw Treaty was described as "an important foundation for mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracy." The statement also warned against "undermining the foundations of the people's democratic order" in Hungary. Referring again to Hungary, the policy statement recognized "the necessity of eliminating serious shortcomings in the field of economic building, of the further raising of the material well-being of the population and of the struggle against bureaucratic distortions in the state apparatus."

5. On 1 November the Government of the People's Republic of China issued an official comment on the statement issued by the Government of the USSR. The following significant points appeared in the PRC statement:

- a. The Chinese Government considers the Soviet declaration to be correct.
- b. The Socialist countries are all independent and sovereign states whose mutual relations should be established on the basis of the five principles (mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-intervention in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence). At the same time Socialist countries are united by the common ideal of socialism and the spirit of proletarian internationalism.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- c. Mistakes have been made in mutual relations of Socialist countries.
- d. "As a result of these misunderstandings and estrangement, a tense situation has sometimes occurred which otherwise would not have occurred. The handling of the 1948-49 Yugoslav situation and the recent happenings in Poland and Hungary are enough to illustrate this." The official New China News Agency corrected this paragraph the same day by interchanging the words "misunderstandings" and "estrangement" and, most significantly, by deleting the words "and Hungary".
- e. The demands of the people of Poland and Hungary for strengthening democracy, independence and equality and for raising the material well-being of the people are "completely proper".
- f. "Because of the unanimity of ideology and aim of struggle, it often happens that certain personnel of Socialist countries neglect the principle of equality among nations in their mutual relations. Such a mistake, by nature, is the error of bourgeois chauvinism. Such a mistake, particularly the mistake of chauvinism by a big country, inevitably results in serious damage to the solidarity and common cause of the Socialist countries."

This reference to the mistake of "bourgeois chauvinism" by certain personnel is interpreted by the American Embassy in Warsaw as originating in an alleged incident reported by Mrs. Gruson, who apparently learned of it from the Polish Central Committee sources mentioned above. This is the report (Embassy telegram 658):

"During a conversation between Mao Tse-tung, Mikoyan and Ochab at Peking festivities /September 1956, 8th CCP Congress/, Ochab explained that, as a result of nationalistic feeling in Poland, the Polish people could not be expected to continue to permit orders to be given them and their government from abroad. Thereupon Mikoyan said obscenely, 'Who gives a damn for people's wishes?'. This cynicism shocked

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

and displeased Mao Tse-tung and Ochab... It was presumably Mikoyan, not Molotov or Khrushchev, that the Chinese had in mind in the November 1 reference to Socialist leaders who disregard equality of nations and commit the error of bourgeois chauvinism."*

Chinese Welcome Soviet Actions in Hungary

6. The Peking People's Daily commented on the Soviet military suppression of the Hungarian revolt in a 4 November editorial entitled "Celebrate the Great Victory of the Hungarian People". In this editorial the Polish situation was not mentioned but the Soviet line was followed in a dogmatic fashion relatively rare in Chicom pronouncements. Excerpts from the editorial follow:

- a. "A successful restoration of counterrevolutionary rule in Hungary would mean a serious threat to the countries from the imperialist aggressive forces."
- b. "It is quite clear that the Hungarian people have won their victory with the help of the Soviet Union. The stand of the

25X1X6

25X1X6

*

[REDACTED] reported another version of an incident involving Mao Tse-tung and Mikoyan at the 8th CCP Congress. (The report as a whole contains much information which is not considered reliable and is included herein only for the record.) Prior to the opening of the plenum, Mao sent various Soviet experts and instructors back to the USSR. At a grand reception, Mao decorated these Soviets and expressed his deep regret that he was obliged to send them home, as the present difficult situation in the Soviet Union would not permit him to rob that country of their valuable assistance. When the plenum opened, Anastayas Mikoyan, who with Edward Ochab had participated as a guest, immediately tried to reprimand Mao for such a move, but Mao retorted that China's ancient culture was not in need of Russian help. Mao's remarks reportedly caused Mikoyan to leave for the USSR two days before the closing session of the plenum. Ochab originally had planned to visit Moscow upon completion of his stay in China, but after these events, Mao advised Ochab against such a plan and even put a Chinese plane at Ochab's disposal.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Soviet Union toward the Hungarian events has been the just stand of proletarian internationalism."

- c. "The importance of the great friendship of the Soviet Union for the peoples of Socialist countries has been gloriously proved once more in the Hungarian events. Some people underestimate the immense importance of Soviet friendship, the spirit of internationalism of the Soviet people, the necessity for solidarity among all Socialist countries, the necessity of the Warsaw Treaty, the need to hold fast to the principle of proletarian internationalism and seriously propagate internationalism among the people's of all countries to overcome the tendency to national chauvinism. The shocking recent events in Hungary should serve as a grave lesson to such people."

7. On the basis of Chicom statements from 1 to 5 November, the American Consulate General in Hong Kong on 6 November, drew the following conclusions:

- "a) While the Chicoms may have approved the liberalization of relations of the Soviet Union with the Satellites, it is unlikely that this support ever went beyond the bounds of the Soviets own policy; even if it did, Peiping immediately and fully adapted itself to changes in Soviet policy;
- b) Main motivations of this Chicom policy are the determination to maintain the solidity of its alliance with Moscow and assist in preventing any sapping of international Communist strength; fear that the Hungarian developments might influence the Chinese people and threaten the regime's internal stability are secondary factors;
- c) While the Chicoms will continue to set their present course on internal matters, the Hungarian incident has made even more remote than before the possibility that Peiping would gravitate towards a Titoist position of greater independence within the bloc;
- d) The changing tenor of these commentaries and close timing of the last two editorials point towards close Moscow-Peiping liaison."

~~SECRET~~

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500370002-4

25X1X6

25X1C3b1

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500370002-4

~~SECRET~~

ranks will pass shortly because of the inevitability of world progress toward Communism. Another possible interpretation, given the elliptical and backwards way often adopted by Communists, is that in the mention of these dates just before the Polish-Soviet talks, the Chinese are gently reminding the Soviets that a stern stand toward the Polish leaders in disregard of the national aspirations of the people of the satellites could prove costly to the world Communist movement.

Chinese Describe Soviet-Polish Agreements as a "Model" for Relations Between Socialist States

10. The Chinese expressed great satisfaction with the outcome of the Polish-Russian talks which ended 18 November. U.S. Ambassador Bohlen commented on the basis of the Polish-Soviet communique that "the Poles appear to have obtained the most they could reasonably have hoped for at a relatively low price." (Moscow Embtel 1272)

In a People's Daily editorial 21 November, the Chinese emphasize that the talks "reflected fraternal relations of mutual respect, confidence, and assistance among the Socialist countries and essential principles guiding relations between Socialist countries put forward in the October 30 declaration of the Soviet Government, namely full equality, respect for territorial inviolability, respect for national independence and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs."

(In an Izvestia editorial on the talks, the Russians emphasized that there can be no antagonism between Socialist states, and added: "The conclusion which emerges from the Polish-Soviet talks is the need to strengthen the friendship between the Socialist countries in every way possible. Moreover, the exchange of experiences in the building of Socialism is of great importance.")

The People's Daily further states that the "significance" of the talks extends far beyond the recognition of the necessity of maintaining the Warsaw Pact. The editorial lists as "an important international aspect" of the talks the "vivid example they provide of proper relations between Socialist countries."* These have to conform to the principles

* In an interview with a Polish reporter during his visit to Vietnam, Chou En-lai commented on the joint statement made after the Polish-Soviet talks as follows: "I consider the statement a very good one. It solves the outstanding problems between Poland and the USSR, between the two governments and two parties. The statement will play an important role in the relations between fraternal socialist countries and constitutes a model for them."

~~SECRET~~

"of full equality, respect for territorial inviolability respect for national independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in each others' domestic affairs."

The editorial goes on to state that proper relations between Socialist countries "must conform to the principles of solidarity and friendship, mutual aid and mutual benefit, and unity to help their economic progress and their opposition to imperialist aggression. But the establishment of these principles does not, in itself, preclude the possibility of mistakes violating them. There were mistakes in the past, there are now, and mistakes will also not be entirely avoided in the future. The question, therefore, is how to deal with such errors... In future relations between Socialist countries, if only the bigger nations pay more attention to avoiding the mistake of big nation chauvinism (this is the main thing--NCNA), and the smaller nations avoid the mistake of nationalism (this is also essential--NCNA), friendship and solidarity based on equality will undoubtedly become consolidated and will advance."

This appears to be a difference in emphasis from the Soviet statement emphasizing unity and solidarity. Possibly the Chinese may feel that the principles of unity, socialist solidarity and proletarian internationalism should be followed on the basis of the principles of full equality, respect for territorial inviolability, respect for national independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in each other's domestic affairs.

Soviet-Rumanian Talks: Do the Chinese Prefer Polish-Soviet Agreements As a Model?

11. Soviet-Rumanian talks were held in Moscow in early December and a joint communique was issued 3 December stressing the identity of the two positions on the assessment of international affairs. The Rumanians did not get as many concessions from the Russians on conduct of their internal affairs as the Poles did; for example the Polish-Soviet communique contains restrictions on the movement of Soviet troops in Poland, subjects the Soviet troops to Polish law, and prohibits the Soviet forces from interfering in the internal affairs of the PPR, while the Rumanian-Soviet statement mentions none of these.

In commenting on the Soviet-Rumanian communique, People's Daily on 6 December praised the unanimity of outlook in international relations and said the talks reaffirmed the principles on which the relationship among Socialist countries is based. These were enumerated as follows: complete equality; respect for each other's territorial integrity, independence, and state sovereignty; and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. Here the Chinese appear to be restating their emphasis on "mutual equality" among Socialist states as a basis for unity, in contrast to the current Russian emphasis on "solidarity".

~~SECRET~~

The editorial further said: "The Chinese people sincerely greet the achievements of the Soviet-Rumanian talks and consider these friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Rumania as exemplary of the relations of all Socialist countries. The more rampant the enemy becomes, the more our solidarity should be strengthened."

The Chinese thus claimed on 6 December to consider the relations between the Soviet Union and Rumania to be a model for mutual Socialist relations. In mid-November, the Chinese said the very different relations between the Soviet Union and Poland were a model for mutual Socialist relations. Since the two model relationships do not appear equally cognizant of "mutual equality" among Socialist states, the two Chinese pronouncements appear somewhat contradictory. This apparent contradiction may be explained by the above underlined statement. If the Chinese considered the "enemy" to be more "rampant" in early December than in mid-November, they may have considered Soviet-Rumanian relationship stressing solidarity to be more appropriate in view of the increasing seriousness of the situation.

Khrushchev Praises CCP for Valuing "Solidarity"

13. N.S. Khrushchev spoke at a Chinese Embassy reception for a visiting National People's Congress delegation in Moscow 29 November. In his remarks complimenting the Chinese Communists, Khrushchev made the following statement:

"The Chinese say: We are bound by ties of unbreakable friendship with the Soviet Union, we in fraternity with the CPSU and other communist and workers parties have used and will use the experience of our Soviet friends, of the whole international workers movement. This shows that the CCP highly values the international solidarity of the working people, the fraternal solidarity of communist and workers parties, and consistently applies the principles of proletarian internationalism."

The Chinese do highly value the principles of solidarity and proletarian internationalism, but Khrushchev neglects to mention that the Chinese have been emphasizing that solidarity must be based on the principles of equality, respect for territorial inviolability, respect for national independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in domestic affairs.

~~SECRET~~

Big Nation Chauvinism

14. The principle of vigilance against "big nation chauvinism" was first stated in the 1 November policy statement of the Chinese Communist Government. It was not restated until after a meeting of the CCP Central Committee held 10-15 November. This was the second Central Committee meeting held since the 8th Congress of late September. On the agenda of this meeting were three points, first of which was the current situation in Egypt, Poland and Hungary. Liu Shao-chi reported on the subject to the Committee. Mao Tse-tung summed up the work of the meeting, according to an NCNA release, but his statement was not published. The press release did state what was apparently the main point of the meeting, that Mao "demanded that the whole Party resolutely oppose great-Han (Chinese race) chauvinism on the question of nationalities, and the great-nation chauvinism in international relations."

This set the line, and the policy has been restated several times since:

- a. Chou En-lai said at a reception in Hanoi 20 November that China would determinedly and thoroughly eradicate great-nation chauvinism, just as Chairman Mao had said.
- b. In the joint statement issued by Chou En-lai and Pham van Dong following the Hanoi talks, both nations pledged to avoid the mistake of chauvinism in international relations. In commenting on the results of these talks, People's Daily viewed the anti-chauvinism clause with favor and added: "Because China is one of the big countries of the world, our people should be particularly alert to guard against great nation chauvinism."
- c. A 21 November People's Daily editorial on the significance of the Soviet-Polish talks, quoted above, stated that in future relations between Socialist countries, "if only the bigger nations pay more attention to avoiding the mistake of big nation chauvinism (and this is the main thing--NCNA) and the smaller nations avoid the mistake of nationalism (this is also essential--NCNA), friendship and solidarity based

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

on equality will undoubtedly become consolidated and will advance." This is the first time since the 1 November statement that "big nation chauvinism" was mentioned directly in relation to Soviet policy toward the Satellites.

- d. Marshal Lo Jui-ching, Minister of Public Security and commander-in-chief of the Public Security Forces, told delegates to the national conference of People's Liberation Army public security activists on 26 November that all coastal defense units of the PLA should resolutely oppose "big nation chauvinism", respect the people of other nations, and adopt a friendly attitude toward them.
- e. Premier Chou En-lai, in a speech in Cambodia 27 November, said: "We are resolutely opposed to chauvinism by any nation, especially great-nation chauvinism. China is determined to prevent the mistake of great-nation chauvinism in its relations with other countries, and strictly adhere to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence." Note: this is the first instance in which the term "great-nation chauvinism" was applied to relations with a non-Socialist state. Chou En-lai later used the term in a similar vein in a speech in Burma.

The term "chauvinism" was defined for the domestic Chinese audience over the Home Service 11 December. Chauvin was said to have "wanted to use force to expand the influence of his own country". The broadcast said that since then, "people state that chauvinism is ridiculous, blind, extremely narrow patriotism and nationalism." Chauvinism was further described as an ideological viewpoint of the bourgeoisie. It may be noted that, although ideologically bourgeois, the term has not been applied to bourgeois countries by the Chinese. It has only been used in reference to relations between Socialist states, or to the relations of a large Socialist state with smaller neighbors.

Yugoslavs Use Chinese Statement in Their Quarrel With the Russians

- 15. The official Yugoslavian Communist Party daily, Borba, on 26 November, cited the Chinese statement of 1 November decrying "big-nation chauvinism" in replying to the 23 November Pravda attack on Tito's views. The significance of this appears to be that the Yugoslavs are trying to bring the Chinese into their own doctrinal disagreement with

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Russia because they feel the Chinese agree with them (the Yugoslavs). The Chinese have refrained from commenting on the dispute, but they did publish, without comment, the text of Tito's 11 November speech at Pula in which Tito blamed the Soviet leaders for developments in Hungary and criticized the Soviet system. The Chinese dispatch summarizes both favorable and unfavorable comment on the speech by Communist leaders and publications in other countries.*

The sections of the Chinese statement emphasized by Borba were (a) that the demands of the people of Poland and Hungary for the strengthening of democracy, independence, and equality and for the raising of the material prosperity of the people are quite proper; and (b) that the error of big nation chauvinism will inevitably lead to the causing of serious damage to the solidarity and the common cause of the socialist countries. Borba emphasized that every honest fighter for socialism who realistically views events will have to agree with these statements.

Yugoslav Claims Chinese Support For "Equality" Doctrine

16. In a confidential speech to the November 1956 Asian Socialist Conference, Yugoslav observer Bakaric commented on the Chinese reaction to the Yugoslav-Russian declaration which followed Tito's June 1955 visit to Moscow. According to a usually reliable source, Bakaric said the Chinese Communist Party was the first to request Yugoslavia to explain and clarify the principles laid down in the declaration and to give a full account of the negotiations. The declaration, which emphasized the principle of equality between the Yugoslav and Russian parties, was fully agreed to by the Chinese Party according to Bakaric. Bakaric said that it was unfortunate that the Chinese never made public their adherence to the Russian-Yugoslav declaration. Bakaric did not elaborate further on the Chinese position.

* In a press conference, in Madras, Chou sidestepped the issue in reply to a question, claiming he had not read Tito's speech or Pravda's comment.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Peking Prints Entire Text of Tito's Critical Pula Speech

17. Peking newspapers on 12 December printed the full text of the speech criticizing the Soviet system made by Tito at Pula on 11 November. The speech was printed without comment, but both favorable and unfavorable comments by Communist leaders and publications in other countries were printed. Within the bloc, only Hungary had previously published the full text. Poland had printed the key elements of the speech without distortion. The rest of the bloc, including the USSR, has printed only distorted summaries or selected passages designed to support the Kremlin's position. Belgrade has been publicly challenging the bloc to print the full text.

Reactions to publication of the speech:

25X1X6 a.

[REDACTED]

lication of the speech was considered there (by whom not stated) as a possible indication that the Chinese leaders might be considering a change of attitude on Hungarian developments. He cited reports that the harsh comments made in Asian non-Communist countries against the role of Soviet tanks in the Hungarian situation came as a surprise to officials close to Premier Chou En-lai during the latter's visit to India. The article said that an official statement clarifying China's position on the problem of relations between the USSR and other Communist countries was expected in two or three days.

25X1X6
25X1C3b1

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

In any case, the line has been too firmly drawn for the Chinese to change their policy on Hungary without consulting Moscow. An unverified report that Chou En-lai may go to Moscow for talks with the Soviet leaders on Hungary was broadcast by the Press Trust of India 19 December. The report quoted a correspondent of the "Times of India" who credited "certain observers" with the belief that "while the Chinese support the Russians on Hungary, they are not in full agreement with them. If this be so, then Chou will be able to quote Asian reaction in support of any plea he might make for a further liberalization of Soviet policy and at a faster pace."

- b. By the Yugoslavs--Smole, the chief editorialist on the Yugoslav paper Borba, commented 12 December to a U.S. Embassy officer on the Chinese publication of the Pula speech. Smole said the most significant and hopeful feature is that the Chinese, even after a three week delay, finally published Tito's Pula speech. He thought the hesitation and delay, plus publication, indicated that the Chinese are not automatically swallowing the Soviet line whole, but that it is still too early to determine the Chinese attitude towards the Hungarian situation. Smole interpreted Chinese publication of Tito's speech as a sign that the Chinese are exerting a restraining force on the Soviets. He also stated that China had played an important role in assisting the establishment of the Gomulka regime in Poland. (Belgrade Embassy telegram 854)

The Embassy telegram indicated that the last remark referred to Gruson's story in the New York Times mentioned in paragraph one.

~~SECRET~~

Sanitized - Approved For Release :
CIA-RDP78-00915R000500370002-4

25X1A6c
25X1X7
25X1A2d1

Sanitized - Approved For Release :
CIA-RDP78-00915R000500370002-4